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INTRODUCTION
More than a century ago, Congress inaugurated federal regula-
tion of foods and drugs.1 By today's standards, the 1906 Act looked
terribly anemic, running just five pages in length. Thirty years later,
reacting to difficulties with enforcing the original statute (as tragically
revealed by a series of fatalities caused by a product called Elixir sulfa-
nilamide), Congress replaced it with the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act (FDCA).2 Although more comprehensive, the new statute contin-
ued to eschew details in favor of broad prohibitions against adultera-
tion and misbranding. The original FDCA filled only fifteen pages in
the U.S. Code. In the intervening years, Congress has both tinkered
with the original language and appended brand new powers and re-
quirements, so that the amended version of the FDCA in the latest
edition of the U.S. Code occupies 230 pages. What started as a fairly
t Professor of Law, University of Florida. This paper provided the basis for a presen-
tation at the ABA's 2007 Administrative Law Institute in Washington, D.C.
1 See Pure Food and Drugs Act, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906) (repealed
1938). Congress had tackled vaccines and other "biologics" a few years earlier. See Bio-
logics Act, Pub. L. No. 57-244, 32 Stat. 728 (1902) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 262
(2000)). For additional history on the 1906 Act, see Arthur Hull Hayes, Jr., Food and Drug
Regulation After 75 Years, 246 JAMA 1223 (1981); Marc T. Law, How Do Regulators Regulate?
Enforcement of the Pure Food and Drugs Act, 1907-38, 22J.L. ECON. & ORG. 459 (2006).
2 Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
§§ 331-397 (2000)); see also David F. Cavers, The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938: Its
Legislative History and Its Substantive Provisions, 6 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 2 (1939); Paul M.
Wax, Elixirs, Diluents, and the Passage of the 1938 Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 122
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 456 (1995).
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simple regime of after-the-fact policing aimed at substandard foods
and drugs has morphed into a complex set of product licensing
requirements.
In delegating this authority, Congress has demanded much from
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), making the agency respon-
sible for twenty-five percent of all consumer goods sold in the United
States,3 but the legislature has not always supplied the regulatory tools
and appropriations needed to fulfill this mandate. Throughout its
history, however, the FDA has had an enviable record of success in the
courts because judges have shown tremendous deference to its exper-
tise in implementing its public health mission.4 For this same reason,
judges also have given the agency greater leeway than normal on ques-
tions of statutory interpretation,5 and the FDA enjoys largely unre-
viewable discretion in deciding whether and how to exercise its
enforcement powers.6
Although it has not fared as well in recent years, the FDA remains
one of the most respected agencies in the federal government. 7 This
respect translates into important clout for an agency that lacks the size
and resources of other regulatory bodies.8 Nonetheless, because of
3 See Rick Weiss & Ariana Eunjung Cha, Pet Deaths Spur Call for Better FDA Screening:
Imports Raise Concern About Human Foods, WASH. POST, May 1, 2007, at Al.
4 See, e.g., Henley v. FDA, 77 F.3d 616, 620-21 (2d Cir. 1996); Schering Corp. v. FDA,
51 F.3d 390, 399-400 (3d Cir. 1995); see also Lars Noah, Scientific "Republicanism": Expert Peer
Review and the Quest for Regulatory Deliberation, 49 EMORY L.J. 1033, 1076 (2000).
5 See United States v. An Article of Drug ... Bacto-Unidisk .... 394 U.S. 784, 798
(1969) (noting "the well-accepted principle that remedial legislation such as the [FDCA] is
to be given a liberal construction consistent with the Act's overriding purpose to protect
the public health"); United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280 (1943).
6 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837-38 (1985); see also United States v. Sage
Pharm., Inc., 210 F.3d 475, 480 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that the FDA could target one
firm for selling unapproved new drugs even though it had not yet acted against others who
distributed substantially similar products). Courts have, however, chastised the agency
when it acts inconsistently in regulating similarly situated products. See, e.g., Bracco Diag-
nostics, Inc. v. Shalala, 963 F. Supp. 20, 28 (D.D.C. 1997); United States v. Undetermined
Quantities of an Article of Drug Labeled as "Exachol," 716 F. Supp. 787, 795-96 (S.D.N.Y.
1989).
7 See Stephen Barr, Users Mostly Rate Agencies Favorably, WASH. PosT, Apr. 13, 2000, at
A29 ("The FDA came out on top in the survey, with more than 80 percent of medical
professionals, business regulatory officers, health and medicine advocates and the chroni-
cally ill responding with favorable impressions of the agency."). Even so, with each widely
publicized crisis over the safety of particular foods or drugs, some of this faith has eroded
in recent years. See Gardiner Harris, Potentially Incompatible Goals at F.D.A., N.Y. TiMES, June
11, 2007, at A14; William Hubbard, Op-Ed., The Overwhelmed FDA, BOSTON GLOBE, June 3,
2007, at C9; Elizabeth Williamson, FDA Was Aware of Dangers to Food: Outbreaks Were Not
Preventable, Officials Say, WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 2007, at Al.
8 See Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, FDA Budget Malnourished, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2006, at
Al; Anna Wilde Mathews, FDA Chief Is in Budget Bind: Leader Embraces Critics' Core Views; A
Public Departure, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 2008, at A6; see also Mary Olson, Substitution in Regula-
tory Agencies: FDA Enforcement Alternatives, 12J.L. ECON. & ORG. 376, 404 (1996) (observing
that, between 1972 and 1992, "budget reductions and increasing applications for product
approval ... led the agency to reduce its monitoring of FDA-regulated industries and to
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the controversial issues that have confronted the agency, it has gone
without permanent leadership for much of the last decade.9 Sepa-
rately, FDA officials sometimes complain that recent legislative direc-
tives and judicial edicts have hamstrung their efforts to protect the
public health.' 0 Even so, the agency continues to manage fairly well,
in part because it has shown little compunction about occasionally
crossing a statutory or constitutional line when necessary to accom-
plish some valuable end.
I
INDIFFERENCE TO STATUTORY BOUNDARIES
As elaborated below, the FDA has disregarded legislative direc-
tives in at least three different, though interrelated, senses: failing to
adhere to procedures specified by Congress; deploying expressly dele-
gated powers in order to achieve ends beyond those envisioned in the
legislation; and branching out to reach matters that arguably exceed
its jurisdiction. In addition to documenting each of these forms of
statutory disregard, this Part notes some of the problems with such
indifference.
A. Taking Procedural Shortcuts
The FDA was one of the first federal agencies to make extensive
use of its initially unclear rulemaking powers. In lieu of bringing en-
forcement actions under the open-ended provisions of the FDCA and
generating adjudicatory precedent for future cases, the FDA began to
promulgate more detailed rules to implement its statutory authority.'"
substitute less resource-intensive enforcement actions"). The agency has stretched its lim-
ited resources in part by delegating limited authority to private entities. See Lars Noah,
Deputizing Institutional Review Boards to Police (Audit?) Biomedical Research, 25 J. LEGAL MED.
267, 272 & n.26, 278-79 (2004). The agency's resource difficulties also have created a
peculiar bargaining dynamic with the pharmaceutical and medical device industries when
Congress periodically leaves these parties to hash out the terms of new user fee legislation.
See Anna Wilde Mathews, Rising FDA Reliance on "User Fees" Boosts Drug Firms Clout in Talks,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 2006, at Al; Cindy Skrzycki, FDA's User-Fee Habit, WASH. POST, Apr. 3,
2007, at DI; see also Notice of Public Meeting, Prescription Drug User Fee Act, 72 Fed. Reg.
1743, 1745 (Jan. 16, 2007) (describing the process used for the development of legislative
recommendations).
9 See Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, The FDA Awaits a Cure for Its Malaise: Problems Pile Up in
the Absence of a Permanent Chief and Political Disputes over Ideology, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2006, at
Al; Marc Kaufman, !DA 's Reliance on Unconfirmed Chiefs Is Faulted, WASH. POST, Dec. 19,
2004, at Al. Shortly after the latest mid-term elections, Andrew von Eschenbach got the
post. See Stephanie Saul, New Leader of the F.D.A. Is Confirmed by the Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
8, 2006, at A30.
10 See, e.g., Marion Burros, FD.A. Commissioner Is Resigning After 6 Stormy Years in Office,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1996, at Al (reporting laments about the deregulation of dietary sup-
plements); see also infra note 93 (noting struggles to regulate food additives).
I See Eric R. Claeys, The Food and Drug Administration and the Command-and-Control
Model of Regulation, 49 ST. Louis U. L.J. 105, 117-21 (2004).
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Although infractions still required individual enforcement proceed-
ings, the agency would simplify its burden of proof in those proceed-
ings, which, coupled with the greater clarity of expectations, would
help to promote improved compliance.
In the FDCA, Congress expressly granted the agency the author-
ity to issue regulations governing certain subjects,' 2 but it also re-
quired that interested parties be allowed to request a public hearing
as part of the rulemaking process. 13 For instance, the FDA's power to
promulgate prescription drug advertising regulations is subject to this
"formal" rulemaking procedure. 14 In practice, these procedures be-
came a source of frustrating delays for the agency.' 5
After courts decided that the residual rulemaking authority in the
statute empowered the FDA to issue binding regulations on matters
not specifically covered by the formal rulemaking provision, 6 the
agency began to utilize "notice-and-comment" procedures for the pro-
mulgation of rules. The courts also, however, allowed interested par-
ties to bring pre-enforcement challenges to such rules. 17 Although
"informal" rulemaking avoided the cumbersome hearings required
with formal rulemaking, searching judicial review on the merits and
increasing procedural demands added by all three branches of gov-
ernment have made it increasingly difficult. As a result, the FDA and
other agencies have experimented with further shortcuts for issuing
regulations. 18
As informal rulemaking became more difficult, the FDA shifted
from promulgating binding rules to issuing nonbinding guidelines.
For instance, rather than go to the trouble of amending its then 25-
year-old regulations delineating "current" good manufacturing prac-
tices (cGMPs) for drugs, the FDA decided to issue guidance for the
adoption of innovative quality control technologies by the pharmaceu-
12 See 21 U.S.C. § 371(e) (2000).
13 See Pharm. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Gardner, 381 F.2d 271, 278 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
14 See 21 U.S.C. § 352(n).
15 See Robert W. Hamilton, Rulemaking on a Record by the Food and Drug Administration,
50 TEX. L. REv. 1132, 1142 (1972) ("IT]he FDA has conducted two major [formal rulemak-
ing] proceedings that have been the subject of wide criticism. Both proceedings have
taken (or will take) more than ten years from the formulation of the original proposal to
the actual effective date of the regulation.").
16 See Nat'l Ass'n of Pharm. Mfrs. v. FDA, 637 F.2d 877 (2d Cir. 1981); Pharm. Mfrs.
Ass'n v. FDA, 634 F.2d 106, 108 (3d Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
17 See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141-48 (1967) (holding that an FDA
drug labeling regulation was ripe for judicial review).
18 See Lars Noah, Doubts About Direct Final Rulemaking, 51 ADMIN. L. REv. 401, 409-11
(1999) (describing the FDA's experience with one such technique, which dispenses with
the need to publish a proposal before issuing a non-controversial rule); id. at 412-28
(questioning the legality of direct final rulemaking).
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tical industry. 19 Similarly, even as prescription drug advertising has
become increasingly sophisticated, 20 reflecting greater ingenuity and
the emergence of brand new media such as the Internet, the FDA has
not revised regulations that it issued during the 1960s, 21 relying in-
stead on various types of guidelines. 22
The agency's growing dependence on guidance documents
presents a couple of problems. First, these informal announcements
may operate as de facto rules but escape normal procedural safe-
guards for their promulgation or review.23 Second, they allow the
FDA to take positions that do not even constrain agency officials,
which leaves regulated entities guessing about their rights and obliga-
tions.2 4 Notwithstanding these concerns, in 1997 Congress endorsed
(subject to certain limitations) this shift to greater reliance on gui-
dance documents.2 5 Thus, the agency has found some convenient
shortcuts for communicating its expectations to regulated entities.
19 See Leila Abboud & Scott Hensley, New Prescription for Drug Makers: Update the Plants,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 3, 2003, at Al; see also Draft Final Guidance for Industry: Guide to Mini-
mize Food Safety Hazards for Fresh-Cut Fruits and Vegetables, 72 Fed. Reg. 11,364 (Mar.
13, 2007).
20 See Lars Noah, Medicine's Epistemology: Mapping the Haphazard Diffusion of Knowledge
in the Biomedical Community, 44 ARIz. L. REv. 373, 430-34 (2002).
21 See Lars Noah, Advertising Prescription Drugs to Consumers: Assessing the Regulatory and
Liability Issues, 32 GA. L. REv. 141, 146 n.21 (1997). Only once in the last forty years has the
FDA engaged in formal rulemaking to deal with advertising issues, and that came in re-
sponse to an explicit congressional directive to issue implementing rules for a new statu-
tory provision. See Dissemination of Information on Unapproved/New Uses for Marketed
Drugs, Biologics, and Devices, 63 Fed. Reg. 64,556 (Nov. 20, 1998) (codified at 21 C.F.R.
pt. 99 (2007)).
22 See, e.g., Draft Guidances for Industry on Improving Information About Medical
Products and Health Conditions, 69 Fed. Reg. 6308 (Feb. 10, 2004); Guidance for Industry
on Consumer-Directed Broadcast Advertisements, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,197 (Aug. 9, 1999); infra
notes 107-13 (discussing guidance documents that address industry distribution of article
reprints and sponsorship of continuing medical education programs).
23 See Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 948-49 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (per
curiam); United States v. Bioclinical Sys., Inc., 666 F. Supp. 82, 83-84 (D. Md. 1987) (re-
jecting the FDA's effort to require that device manufacturers adhere to a sterility guideline
that was not promulgated through notice-and-comment rulemaking); see also Syncor Int'l
Corp. v. Shalala, 127 F.3d 90, 94-95 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (rejecting the FDA's claim that an
interpretive rule was exempt from notice-and-comment requirements).
24 See Lars Noah, The FDA's New Policy on Guidelines: Having Your Cake and Eating It Too,
47 CATH. U. L. REV. 113, 140-42 (1997) (criticizing the agency's practice of not taking
definitive positions in guidance documents and, thereby, attempting to escape judicial
review).
25 See Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. 105-115,
§ 405, 111 Stat. 2296, 2368 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 371(h) (2000)) [hereinafter FDAMA];
see also Annual Comprehensive List of Guidance Documents at the Food and Drug Admin-
istration, 71 Fed. Reg. 15,422 (Mar. 28, 2006) (listing hundreds of guidelines). One dec-
ade later, the Executive branch decided to pay closer attention to the proliferation of these
nonbinding announcements emanating from all agencies. See Exec. Order No. 13,422, 72
Fed. Reg. 2763 (Jan. 18, 2007); Stephen M.Johnson, Good Guidance, Good Grief!, 72 Mo. L.
REv. 695, 722-26 (2007).
2008]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:901
B. Making the Most of Limited Tools 26
Congress originally granted the FDA only limited and procedur-
ally cumbersome mechanisms for securing compliance with the stat-
ute: product seizures, injunctions, and criminal penalties. 27 The
agency has, however, deployed these tools in creative ways: for in-
stance, the FDA may threaten to impose a sanction or withhold a ben-
efit in the hopes of encouraging "voluntary" compliance with a
request that the agency could not impose directly on a regulated en-
tity.2 8 Often such threats simply represent a more efficient method
for achieving ends explicitly authorized by Congress, but in some
cases they allow the FDA to pursue extrastatutory goals.
Such "arm-twisting" succeeds, and evades judicial or other scru-
tiny, in part because companies in pervasively regulated industries be-
lieve that they cannot afford to resist agency demands. For instance,
some critics have accused the FDA of retaliating against firms that fail
to cooperate. 29 Whether or not such charges are accurate, the per-
ception leads companies to accede to the agency's wishes even though
they may lack any basis in law or fact.30 Whatever the reason, the FDA
26 This section draws extensively from Lars Noah, Administrative Arm-Twisting in the
Shadow of Congressional Delegations of Authority, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 873.
27 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 332-334 (2000).
28 See Noah, supra note 26, at 874. The agency has long relied on such techniques. See
H. Thomas Austern, Expertise in Vivo, 15 ADMIN. L. REv. 46, 50, 56 (1963) (discussing infor-
mal enforcement by the FDA through "jaw-boning" and "lifted eyebrow" techniques, which
succeed because of the ever-present threat of criminal sanctions); id. at 52 ("[I] n this field
what the agency concludes, the court approves; and most of those regulated do not often
dare to challenge an informal assertion of power."); id. at 54 ("Every finding is dressed up
as a scientific determination. ... The FDA rule-making process, by and large, has virtual
immunity from judicial intervention or correction.").
29 See Se. Minerals, Inc. v. Harris, 622 F.2d 758, 761 (5th Cir. 1980); id. at 767 (criticiz-
ing the agency's "bureaucratic hubris that confuses abuse of power with reason," and ad-
ding that "the FDA's abuse of its statutory rights of entry and inspection so as to harass and
threaten [the parties] can in no way be condoned"); Allegations of FDA Abuses of Authority:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Commerce, 104th
Cong. 2 (1995) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Hon. Joe Barton) (suggesting that
"these stories are not rare exceptions," and adding that "the FDA never forgets who its
enemies are"); id. at 9 (statement of Hon. ThomasJ. Bliley, Jr.) (suggesting that "the threat
of retaliation is deeply embedded in the culture of this Agency"). But see id. at 6 (statement
of Hon. Henry A. Waxman) (warning that we should "not base our policy decisions on
anecdotes and hyperbole"); id. at 83 (statement of Hon. John D. Dingell) (noting that,
.upon a fuller review of the five case studies selected by the Majority, claims of FDA retalia-
tion were decidedly premature").
30 See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 29, at 70 (testimony of Ronald C. Jankelson, Myo-
Tronics, Inc.) (describing pressures to enter into a consent decree); see also Elizabeth C.
Price, Teaching the Elephant to Dance: Privatizing the FDA Review Process, 51 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
651, 653 (1996) ("The natural response to such alleged abusive tactics would be to bring
suit against the agency, but such a response might not be in the best interests of the af-
fected company."); Peter Brimelow & Leslie Spencer, Food and Drugs and Politics, FORBES,
Nov. 22, 1993, at 115, 116 (reporting that 84% of survey respondents had failed to press
potentially legitimate complaints against the FDA for fear of retaliation).
906
2008] THE LITTLE AGENCY THAT COULD 907
has managed to accomplish things that arguably exceed the limits of
its delegated authority.
The FDA routinely issues "warning letters" that allege some regu-
latory infraction and provide the recipient with a limited period of
time to take corrective action (coupled with a threat of formal en-
forcement proceedings). 3' In the case of drugs and medical devices,
the FDA used to go further and explain that it had advised govern-
ment purchasing entities to stop dealing with the firm in the
meantime.3 2 Because the federal government represents the single
largest purchaser of prescription drugs in this country,33 few manufac-
turers could afford to risk losing these contracts. If a company dared
to disagree with the agency's allegations and chose to pursue ajudicial
challenge rather than accede to its demands, the FDA invariably ar-
gued that the controversy was not ripe for review.34 Only once did a
court hold that such a challenge was justiciable on the basis of an
interim procurement freeze. 35
If a company voluntarily corrected the violations of federal law
alleged in a warning letter, whether or not accompanied by a
31 See Marc Kaufman, Study Cites Marked Drop in FDA's Warning Letters, WASH. POST,
June 27, 2006, at A19; see also Mary K. Olson, Agency Rulemaking, Political Influences, Regula-
tion, and Industry Compliance, 15J.L. ECON. & ORG. 573, 573-75 (1999) (noting a decline in
FDA inspections coupled with an increase in reported infractions). The FDA's counterpart
in Canada operates almost exclusively in this fashion. See Scott Martin, Note, Unlabeled
"Drugs" as U.S. Health Policy: The Case for Allowing Health Claims on Medicinal Herb Labels;
Canada Provides a Model for Reform, 9 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 545, 568 (1992).
32 See Noah, supra note 26, at 886 n.47.
33 See Scott Hensley, Big Buyers Push for Steep Price Cuts from Drug Makers, WALL ST. J.,
June 22, 2006, at BI (explaining that, as the health insurer for over five million individuals,
the Department of Veterans Affairs can exercise significant leverage in procurement
deals); Robert Pear, Medicare Law Prompts a Rush for Lobbyists, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2005, at
Al (reporting that "Medicare and Medicaid will account for 37 percent of all spending on
prescription drugs next year, up from 20 percent this year" and that "Medicare will spend
more than $1 trillion on prescription drugs in the next 10 years").
34 See, e.g., Dietary Supplement Coal., Inc. v. Kessler, 978 F.2d 560, 563 (9th Cir. 1992)
(noting that an FDA regulatory letter does not constitute final agency action); Prof'ls &
Patients for Customized Care v. Shalala, 847 F. Supp. 1359, 1365 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (explain-
ing that warning letters do not constitute final agency action but instead "merely establish
a dialogue between the FDA and the pharmacist and do not necessarily lead to further
sanctions"), affd, 56 F.3d 592, 599-600 (5th Cir. 1995). But see Wash. Legal Found. v.
Kessler, 880 F. Supp. 26, 29-30, 34-36 (D.D.C. 1995) (holding that a challenge to the
FDA's unofficial policy against drug industry sponsorship of scientific symposia was ripe for
review based in part on warning letters alleging the unlawful promotion of off-label uses at
such meetings).
35 See Den-Mat Corp. v. United States, No. MJG-92-444, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12233,
at *13 (D. Md. Aug. 17, 1992) ("Such action by the FDA would effectively 'seize' all prod-
ucts that normally would be sold to federal agencies."). The court also expressed concern
that "the FDA may have targeted Den-Mat... for a publicity campaign designed to coerce
Den-Mat (and others) into complying with the agency's decision." Id. at *14. "[1]t would
be inherently unfair to allow the FDA to continue to 'enforce' its determination [through
indirect means] without allowing the affected party an opportunity to prove that the FDA's
position is wrong." Id. at *15 & n.6.
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threatened procurement freeze, it lost any opportunity to challenge
the legal basis for the FDA's objections. In this manner, as explained
in the sections that follow, the agency has managed to exercise a recall
power not delegated by Congress. In addition, and without the need
to allege any wrongdoing or threaten formal enforcement action, the
agency has conditioned the granting of licenses on various postap-
proval restrictions not contemplated in the statute.
1. Encouraging Product Recalls
The FDA generally lacks the statutory authority to order a recall
of potentially dangerous products subject to its regulatory jurisdic-
tion. 36 Although Congress has granted the agency such authority with
regard to limited classes of products,3 7 and government reports have
recommended providing it with broader recall powers, 38 the FDA gen-
erally has resisted proposals to provide it with explicit recall author-
ity. 39 Instead, the agency prefers encouraging voluntary recalls, and it
even has promulgated detailed regulations setting forth its recall pro-
cedures and policies.40
This strategy has succeeded because firms know that a failure to
cooperate with an agency request would invite more draconian en-
36 See Nat'l Confectioners Ass'n v. Califano, 569 F.2d 690, 694 (D.C. Cir. 1978);
United States v. Superpharm Corp., 530 F. Supp. 408, 410 (E.D.N.Y. 1981); United States v.
C.E.B. Prods., Inc., 380 F. Supp. 664, 667-72 (N.D. Ill. 1974). But cf United States v. K-N
Enter., Inc., 461 F. Supp. 988, 990-91 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (reading the FDCA broadly as au-
thorizing a court-ordered recall of adulterated drugs). In recent years, however, courts
have construed the FDA's power to request injunctive relief more broadly to include reme-
dies not delineated in the statute. See, e.g., United States v. Rx Depot, Inc., 438 F.3d 1052,
1058-63 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Lane Labs-USA Inc., 427 F.3d 219, 233-36 (3d
Cir. 2005) (upholding a district court order that the seller of unapproved new drugs pay
restitution to consumers).
37 See, e.g., Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-629, § 8, 104 Stat. 4511,
4520-21 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360h(e) (2000)); Infant Formula Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-359, § 2, 94 Stat. 1190, 1190-91 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 350a(f) (2000)).
38 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 102-1030, at 12-13, 15 (1992); Recommendations of the
Administrative Conference Regarding Administrative Practice and Procedure, 49 Fed. Reg.
29,937, 29,940-41 (July 25, 1984).
39 See Eugene M. Pfeifer, Enforcement, in FoOD AND DRUG LAw 72, 101 (1984) ("It real-
istically fears that Congress would legislate burdensome, time-consuming procedural re-
quirements .... Because requests for recalls-backed by the implicit threa[t] of court
actions and publicity-are generally complied with, the agency has been unwilling tojeop-
ardize what it regards as an efficient, albeit voluntary, recall system.").
40 See Recalls (Including Product Corrections)-Guidelines on Policy, Procedures,
and Industry Responsibilities, 43 Fed. Reg. 26,202, 26,218 (June 16, 1978) (codified as
amended at 21 C.F.R. pt. 7(C) (2007)); see also 21 C.F.R. § 7.40(a) ("This [subpart] recog-
nize[s] the voluntary nature of recall by providing guidance so that responsible firms may
effectively discharge their recall responsibilities."). For one recent example of a "volun-
tary" (though grudging) product withdrawal, see Marc Kaufman, Another Pain Reliever Pul-
led: FDA Warns of Risk in Entire Class of Anti-Inflammatories, WASH. POST, Apr. 8, 2005, at Al
(Bextra®).
2008] THE LI7TLE AGENCY THAT COULD
forcement measures authorized by statute.41 Because these necessi-
tate judicial proceedings, however, the issuance of adverse publicity
may represent a still more effective way of prompting action.42 Com-
panies often prefer a voluntary recall because it allows them to exer-
cise greater control over the nature and extent of public notification
about any hazards associated with their particular product.43
The FDCA expressly authorizes the issuance of adverse publicity,
though only in limited circumstances. 44 Even then, targets of an in-
formation campaign often have no meaningful opportunity to re-
spond to the charges or seek judicial review. 45 In recognition of the
risk of improper use, the FDA once proposed a policy to limit the
issuance of such publicity.46 The agency never finalized this proposal,
and it continues to rely on explicit or implicit threats of disseminating
bad press as a method of encouraging voluntary compliance with its
recall and other demands. 47
41 See 21 C.F.R. § 7.40(c) ("Seizure, multiple seizure, or other court action is indicated
when a firm refuses to undertake a recall requested by the [FDA] .... "); Proposed Rule,
Enforcement Policy, Practices and Procedures: Recall Policy and Procedures, 4] Fed. Reg.
26,924, 26,924 (June 30, 1976) ("While the act does not explicitly mention recalls, the
statutory sanctions available to FDA have a vital role in a firm's willingness to recall and
support the development of recall as a major FDA regulatory tool.").
42 See Ernest Gellhorn, Adverse Publicity by Administrative Agencies, 86 HARv. L. REv.
1380, 1408 (1973) ("Since [recalls] cannot be required by law, the FDA ensures compli-
ance by threatening seizure, injunction, and the issuance of publicity. Of these, the threat
of publicity is usually the most potent persuader."); id. at 1415 (noting that the FDA appar-
ently "cannot resist the temptation of using [public] warnings to operate an extrastatutory
recall program").
43 Cf Heart Device Warning May Change: The FDA Is Considering a Physician Group's Re-
quest Not to Use the Word "Recall" Because It May Cause Undue Alarm, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 29,
2006, at C3.
44 See 21 U.S.C. § 375(b) (2000) ("The Secretary may also cause to be disseminated
information regarding food, drugs, devices, or cosmetics in situations involving, in the
opinion of the Secretary, imminent danger to health or gross deception of the con-
sumer."); see also Ajay Nutrition Foods, Inc. v. FDA, 378 F. Supp. 210, 216-19 (D.N.J. 1974)
(refusing to enjoin adverse publicity issued by the FDA), affd mem., 513 F.2d 625 (3d Cir.
1975); Hoxsey Cancer Clinic v. Folsom, 155 F. Supp. 376, 378 (D.D.C. 1957) (same).
45 See H. Thomas Austern, Sanctions in a Silhouette, in WALTER GELLHORN & CLARK
BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 671, 674 (4th ed. 1960) ("Never forget that the publicity sanc-
tion-that omnibus condemnation by press release-goes forward without formal evi-
dence, without any opportunity for hearing, without counsel and, of course, without the
remotest possibility of court review."); Gellhorn, supra note 42, at 1424 ("Publicity is
quicker and cheaper; it is not presently subject to judicial review or other effective legal
control; and it involves the exercise of pure administrative discretion."); id. at 1441 ("Ad-
verse agency publicity is a powerful and often unruly nonlegal sanction.").
46 See Proposed Rule, Administrative Practices and Procedures: Publicity Policy, 42
Fed. Reg. 12,436, 12,440-41 (Mar. 4, 1977), withdrawn, 56 Fed. Reg. 67,446 (Dec. 30,
1991).
47 See Michael T. Roberts, Mandatory Recall Authority: A Sensible and Minimalist Approach
to Improving Food Safety, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 563, 567-68 (2004). Agency publicity may
serve to inform the public or sanction a wrongdoer. See Gellhorn, supra note 42, at 1383
("Occasionally publicity which informs or warns also functions to punish law violators, to
deter unlawful conduct, or to force a transgressor to negotiate and settle."); id. at 1424
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During the early 1990s, the FDA negotiated consent decrees with
pharmaceutical companies that it had accused of unlawfully promot-
ing certain prescription drugs. In one of these cases, a manufacturer
agreed to undertake an extensive corrective advertising campaign and
also to preclear all of its promotional materials with the agency for a
period of two years, 48 even though the statute generally prohibits
mandatory preclearance of pharmaceutical advertising.49 In another
case, a company agreed to establish an FDA-approved training pro-
gram for its pharmaceutical sales representatives, 50 even though the
agency does not appear to have the power to regulate such communi-
cations.51 In these and other cases, explicit FDA threats of especially
burdensome product seizures or injunctions prompted the companies
to accept these unprecedented requirements. 52
n.177 (noting that "the FDA's use of publicity in its recall program is paradigmatic" of this
dual use). In effect, the government threatens to engage in product disparagement in
order to shame the seller into altering its behavior.
48 See Syntex Will Run Naprosyn Corrective Ads in 18 Medical Journals and on "Lifetime" TV
in Court-Filed Consent Decree to Halt Arthroprotective Claims, F-D-C REP. ("The Pink Sheet"),
Oct. 14, 1991, at 6, 8 [hereinafter Syntex Decree] (reporting that "[t]he comprehensive
scope and breadth of FDA scrutiny set out in the consent agreement are unprecedented");
see also Bristol Oncology Promotions Will Be Precleared by FDA for Two Years: Automatic Go-Ahead
May Protect Company ftom Delays in Agency Ad Reviews, F-D-C REP. ("The Pink Sheet"), June 3,
1991, at 6, 6 (describing a preclearance requirement covering about a dozen products in a
consent decree negotiated with Bristol-Myers Squibb, and adding that "[t]he agency has
extracted similar agreements in recent years").
49 See 21 U.S.C. § 352(n) (providing that, "except in extraordinary circumstances, no
regulation issued under this paragraph shall require prior approval by the Secretary of the
content of any advertisement"); see also 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(j) (2007) (calling for FDA
preclearance of proposed advertisements only if unexpected fatalities or other serious side
effects come to light); Request for Comments, Direct-to-Consumer Promotion, 61 Fed.
Reg. 24,314, 24,314-15 (May 14, 1996) (disavowing any intent to require routine
preclearance of prescription drug ads).
50 See Kabi Pharmacia's Dipentum Consent Decree Requires FDA-Approved Training Program
for Sales Reps; July 30 Order Is FDA's First "Significant" Detailing Case, F-D-C REP. ("The Pink
Sheet"), Aug. 9, 1993, at 17, 17 (noting that the "FDA's involvement in developing a train-
ing program is unprecedented"). Other provisions of this consent decree required correc-
tive advertising, preclearance of all promotional materials for one year, and
reimbursement of the costs of the FDA's investigation. See id. at 18.
51 See Lars Noah, Death of a Salesman: To What Extent Can the FDA Regulate the Promo-
tional Statements of Pharmaceutical Sales Representatives?, 47 FooD & DRUG L.J. 309, 322-26
(1992).
52 See, e.g., Syntex Decree, supra note 48, at 8 ("To get the Syntex agreement, FDA is
understood to have threatened to seize all of the company's stocks of Naprosyn."); see also
FDA 's Generic Drug Enforcement Policies Will Be Reviewed, F-D-C REP. ("The Pink Sheet"), Aug.
31, 1992, at T&G-1 (reporting congressional concerns about the "FDA's recent approach
to pressuring firms for corrections of alleged violations. In one case, involving Barr Labo-
ratories, FDA has offered the firm the choice of signing a consent decree and agreeing to
correct alleged deficiencies or facing an injunction that would shut down operations.").
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2. Demanding Postapproval Restrictions
Product licensing gives the FDA even greater leverage for ex-
tracting concessions from sellers. In 1996, for instance, the agency
approved Procter & Gamble's food additive petition for the non-ca-
loric fat substitute olestra, though only for use in certain snack
foods.53 Nearly twenty-five years had elapsed between the company's
initial contacts with agency officials and final approval, and Procter &
Gamble spent more than $200 million in the product development
process. 54 Indeed, the FDA approved olestrajust days before the expi-
ration of the company's previously extended patents.55 The final reg-
ulation conditioned use of the additive on special labeling, vitamin
fortification, and the submission of follow-up reports to allow for fur-
ther agency review.56
The requirement for postmarket surveillance represented one of
the most curious features of the approval. The regulation itself did
not mandate further testing by the petitioner; it only provided that
the FDA "will review and evaluate all data and information bearing on
the safety of olestra received by the agency."57 In the preamble ac-
companying the regulation, however, the agency explained that "as a
condition of approval, Procter and Gamble is to conduct the studies
that it has identified in its letter to FDA,' 58 and it warned that, "if
Procter and Gamble does not conduct the identified studies and does
not conduct them according to the articulated timetable, FDA will
53 See Food Additives Permitted for Direct Addition to Food for Human Consump-
tion; Olestra, 61 Fed. Reg. 3118, 3171-72 (Jan. 30, 1996) (codified as amended at 21 C.F.R.
§ 172.867 (2007)).
54 See Marian Burros, Intensifying Debate on a Fat Substitute, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1996, at
Cl.
55 See Sally Squires, IDA Decision Nears on Fat Substitute, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 1996, at
F8. Upon approval, the company became eligible for limited patent term restoration. See
Determination of Regulatory Review Period for Purposes of Patent Extension, 62 Fed. Reg.
763 (Jan. 6, 1997); see also Raju Narisetti, Anatomy of a Food Fight: The Olestra Debate, WALL ST.
J., July 31, 1996, at B1.
56 See 21 C.F.R. § 172.867(d)-(f) (2004) (repealed 2004).
57 Id. § 172.867(f). Eight years later, after conducting this further review, the agency
amended the rule. See Food Additives Permitted for Direct Addition to Food for Human
Consumption; Olestra, 69 Fed. Reg. 29,428, 29,432 (May 24, 2004) (codified at 21 C.F.R.
§ 172.867).
58 61 Fed. Reg. at 3168 ("Procter and Gamble has notified FDA that the company will
be conducting additional studies of olestra exposure (both amounts consumed and pat-
terns of consumption) and the effects of olestra consumption . . . ."); see also U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FOOD SAFETY AND QUALITY: INNOVATIVE STRATEGIES MAY BE NEEDED TO
REGULATE NEW FOOD TECHNOLOGIES, No. RCED-93-142 (1993), at 61 [hereinafter GAO]
(According to one official, the "FDA may try to negotiate requirements for firms to con-
duct postmarket surveillance, including the collection and reporting of data on dietary use
and on any adverse effects, as a condition for approving novel macro-ingredients as food
additives.").
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consider the approval set forth in this document to be void ab initio
and will institute appropriate proceedings. ' 59
By making this threat, the agency incorrectly implied that food
additive approval served as a private license rather than as a public
regulation available, subject only to patent limitations, to any firm
wishing to manufacture and sell the additive.60 The FDA's threat also
seemingly ignored the procedures specified by Congress for withdraw-
ing an approval. 61 The agency responded that its postmarket surveil-
lance condition "is not without precedent," citing the more limited
data collection requirement imposed fifteen years earlier on the man-
ufacturer of the food additive aspartame,62 but this also had reflected
a nominally voluntary undertaking by the sponsor. 63
Even more so than it does in the case of food additives, the FDA
carefully reviews all new drug products prior to marketing. Until re-
cently, the FDCA made no mention of postmarket (so-called "Phase
IV") study requirements, 64 but the agency long ago issued regulations
governing such clinical trials. 65 As a condition of product approval,
the FDA often has demanded that applicants undertake postapproval
59 61 Fed. Reg. at 3169. The preamble provided little information about the nature
of this correspondence, though the letter from the company referenced by the agency-
dated one month after the close of the public comment period and less than one week
before publication of the approval-suggested last minute negotiations.
60 See GAO, supra note 58, at 27 ("Unlike approvals for new drugs, food additives
regulations are not licenses. Once FDA has issued a regulation specifying the uses and
conditions of use for a food additive, any company is free to market the additive as long as
the additive is in compliance with the regulation and is not patented.").
61 See 21 U.S.C. § 348(h) (2000); 21 C.F.R. § 171.130.
62 61 Fed. Reg. at 3169. The final decision approving aspartame included the follow-
ing additional condition: "Searle is to monitor the actual use levels of aspartame and to
provide such information on aspartame's use to the Bureau of Foods as the Bureau may
deem necessary by an order, in the form of a letter, to Searle." Aspartame: Commissioner's
Final Decision, 46 Fed. Reg. 38,285, 38,303 (July 24, 1981).
63 See GAO, supra note 58, at 61 ("In at least one instance, FDA has been able to
obtain voluntary postmarket surveillance for a food additive (Aspartame, an artificial sweet-
ener) as part of the approval process for this substance. However, FDA does not have the
statutory authority to require surveillance for food products, as it does for human
drugs .... ").
64 See Robert L. Fleshner, Post-Marketing Surveillance of Prescription Drugs: Do We Need to
Amend the FDCA, 18 HARV.J. ON LEGIS. 327, 329-31 (1981). In 1997, Congress authorized
such requirements, though only for drugs eligible for "fast track" review. See FDAMA, Pub.
L. No. 105-115, §§ 112, 130, 111 Stat. 2296, 2309-10, 2331-32 (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C. §§ 356(b), 356b(a) (2000)); see also Curt D. Furberg et al., The FDA and Drug Safety:
A Proposal for Sweeping Changes, 166 ARCHIVES INrERNAL MED. 1938, 1940-41 (2006) (recom-
mending, among other things, routine Phase IV trials). One decade later, it broadened
the agency's authority in this area. See Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of
2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, tit. IX, 121 Stat. 823, 922.
65 See Approved New Drugs That Require Continuation of Longterm Studies,
Records, and Reports, 35 Fed. Reg. 14,784 (Sept. 23, 1970) (codified as amended at 21
C.F.R. § 310.303(a) (2007)).
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research, 66 though it has done a poor job of holding pharmaceutical
manufacturers to these promises. 67
In 1992, in response to complaints about excessive delays in ap-
proving AIDS drugs, the agency promulgated regulations to establish
an accelerated approval procedure for new drugs and biologics in-
tended to treat serious or life-threatening illnesses. 68 Before approv-
ing a new drug, the FDA must find that it is both safe and effective,
but under the accelerated approval procedures it accepted weaker evi-
dence of effectiveness than normally required. 69 If a pharmaceutical
company wanted to utilize this expedited licensing procedure, it had
to agree to several conditions on approval not originally authorized by
Congress. For example, an applicant would have to accept any neces-
sary postmarketing restrictions, including distribution only through
certain medical facilities or by specially trained physicians, distribu-
tion conditioned on the performance of specified medical proce-
dures, and advance submission of all promotional materials for FDA
review. 70 At the time that the agency issued the rule, however, the
governing statute did not authorize the imposition of any of these
conditions. 7' Moreover, the FDA insisted that a company waive its
statutory right to demand an evidentiary hearing in the event that the
agency later chose to withdraw the approval. 72
In response to industry complaints about such conditions, the
FDA explained that any "applicants objecting to these procedures may
forego approval under these regulations and seek approval under the
66 See Charles Steenburg, The Food and Drug Administration's Use of Postmarketing (Phase
IV) Study Requirements: Exception to the Rule, 61 FooD & DRUG L.J. 295, 325-27 (2006).
67 See Jennifer Corbett Dooren, Review Finds Gap in Required Study of Approved Drugs,
WALL ST. J., June 1, 2005, at D4; 65% of Promised Drug Studies Pending, WASH. POST, Mar. 4,
2006, at A4.
68 See New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological Drug Product Regulations: Accelerated
Approval, 57 Fed. Reg. 58,942, 58,958-60 (Dec. 11, 1992) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pts.
314(H), 601(E) (2007)).
69 For instance, the FDA will accept evidence of drug effectiveness in attaining "surro-
gate endpoints" (e.g., reductions in CD4 cell counts or tumor shrinkage) in lieu of the
more difficult to prove "clinical endpoints" (e.g., improved survival). See 21 C.F.R.
§§ 314.510, 601.41 (2007); 57 Fed. Reg. at 58,943-44. Approval predicated on surrogate
endpoints requires that the applicant agree to conduct postmarketing studies relating to
the clinical endpoints. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.510, 601.41.
70 See 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.520(a), 314.550, 601.42(a), 601.45.
71 See supra note 49 (describing limits on the power to preclear advertising); infra note
78 (discussing limitations on the power to restrict distribution). The FDA responded that
the statute provided it with sufficient flexibility to impose these various conditions for ac-
celerated approvals. See 57 Fed. Reg. at 58,949, 58,951 (alluding to the "spirit" of the stat-
ute); id. at 58,953-54 (citing its broad rulemaking authority); see alsoJeffrey E. Shuren, The
Modern Regulatory Administrative State: A Response to Changing Circumstances, 38 HARV. J. ON
LEGIs. 291, 308-15 (2001) (defending these initiatives).
72 See 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.530, 601.43 (providing the applicant with only an informal
hearing prior to revocation).
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traditional approval process. '73 With potentially millions of dollars in
revenue foregone for each additional month awaiting approval,74 eli-
gible drug companies could not afford to decline the invitation to
make use of these accelerated procedures, and the industry never
challenged the rules in court. Five years later, Congress belatedly au-
thorized these special procedures for what it called "fast track" re-
view,7 5 and, thanks to these initiatives, the agency has succeeded in
rapidly approving important new therapies. 76
In the last decade, as the pendulum has swung from complaints
about excessive agency caution in approving critically needed treat-
ments to criticisms about excessive haste in approving sometimes less-
than-critical (a.k.a. "lifestyle") drugs that turn out to pose undue risks,
the FDA has shown interest in developing more tailored risk manage-
ment strategies. These efforts might include restricting distribution to
certain specialists, 77 patient informed consent requirements, struc-
73 57 Fed. Reg. at 58,955. The FDA also explained that no court had interpreted the
statute as requiring a formal evidentiary hearing before withdrawing approval, but that its
own regulations provided for such a hearing. See id. Although the agency may utilize a
summary judgment procedure to deny hearing requests when it withdraws its approval of a
new drug, see Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 620-22
(1973), it must provide a hearing when genuine issues are in dispute, see id. at 623; Edison
Pharm. Co. v. FDA, 513 F.2d 1063, 1072 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Sterling Drug Inc. v. Weinberger,
503 F.2d 675, 680-83 (2d Cir. 1974). The FDA also argued that the less formal hearing
procedure that it provided for withdrawals of accelerated approvals would give the appli-
cant adequate notice and opportunity to be heard. See 57 Fed. Reg. at 58,955.
74 See User Fees for Prescription Drugs: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Envi-
ronment of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong. 10 (1992) (statement of David
A. Kessler, Comm'r, FDA) ("For a drug that raises $200 million a year in annual sales,
assuming an 80 percent gross margin, every additional month of delay the Agency takes to
review an application would cost the company about $10 million in lost opportunity."); see
alsoJoseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22
J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 160-61 (2003); Peter Landers, Drug Firms See Costs Increase to Bring a
Product to Market, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 2003, at B4 ($1.7 billion).
75 See FDAMA, Pub. L. No. 105-115, § 112, 111 Stat. 2296, 2309-10 (codified at 21
U.S.C. § 356 (2000)); see also id. § 103, 111 Stat. at 2299-304 (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C. §§ 379g-379h) (reauthorizing the imposition of user fees); Deborah G. Parver,
Comment, Expediting the Drug Approval Process: An Analysis of the FDA Modernization Act of
1997, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 1249 (1999); Diedtra Henderson, Drug Makers Lobby US to Hike FDA
Funds, BOSTON GLOBE, July 13, 2006, at El (reporting that in FY2004 the agency collected
$232 million in user fees, which accounted for more than half of its budget for new drug
reviews, and had doubled its review staff since 1992).
76 See, e.g., Mary K. Olson, Managing Delegation in the FDA: Reducing Delay in New-Drug
Review, 29J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 397, 406, 426 (2004); Marc Kaufman, FDA Clears Once-
a-Day AIDS Drug: Single-Pill Regimen Hailed as Milestone, WASH. POST, July 13, 2006, at Al
("The FDA has approved 28 products in the United States to treat HIV infection-most of
them as high-priority applications."); cf Gardiner Harris, ED.A. Responds to Criticism with
New Caution, N.Y. TiMES, Aug. 6, 2005, at Al; Anna Wilde Mathews & John Hechinger, Are
Too Many Unproven Drugs Receiving FDA Early Approval?: Process Comes Under Scrutiny, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 1, 2005, at B1.
77 See Lars Noah, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Pitfalls of Unregulated Biomedi-
cal Innovation, 55 FLA. L. REv. 603, 654 (2003) (suggesting that only reproductive endocri-
nologists should get access to fertility drugs); Lars Noah, Challenges in the Federal Regulation
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tured postmarket surveillance, and mandatory concomitant therapy
or patient monitoring. In addition, the agency might seek to prohibit
certain off-label uses, perhaps in those situations where the labeling
specifically contraindicates a use. Whether or not drugs qualify for
fast track status, serious questions exist about the FDA's power to im-
pose such restrictions under its current statutory authority,78 but the
agency generally has managed to encourage pharmaceutical manufac-
turers to accept such limitations as a condition of product approval.7 9
In some cases, physicians must register with the manufacturer-
attesting that they understand the risks and benefits of a particular
drug-before they may prescribe it.80 For instance, when it approved
Thalomid® (thalidomide) for the treatment of leprosy patients, the
FDA conditioned approval on extremely strict marketing controls be-
cause of the serious risk of birth defects: distribution only through
specially registered physicians and pharmacists, and tracking of pa-
tients, who must agree to use two forms of contraception and undergo
frequent pregnancy tests.8 ' The agency secured comparable distribu-
of Pain Management Technologies, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 55, 64 (2003) ("[T]he government
might limit access to those medical specialists who usually encounter persons suffering
severe or chronic pain-including, for instance, oncologists and orthopedic surgeons
along with pain specialists-in the hopes that such specialists would better resist the ten-
dency to prescribe Schedule II analgesics for patients for whom milder agents would work
equally well."); Scott B. Markow, Note, Penetrating the Walls of Drug-Resistant Bacteria: A Statu-
tory Prescription to Combat Antibiotic Misuse, 87 GEO. L.J. 531, 546-47 (1998) (suggesting that
only infectious disease specialists in hospitals be permitted to use the latest antibiotics). In
approving the expanded use of a biosynthetic growth hormone to treat very short children,
the FDA persuaded the manufacturer to market this new use only to pediatric endocrinolo-
gists. See Jeff Swiatek, 1DA OKs Lilly Growth Drug, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, July 26, 2003, at 1C.
78 See Am. Pharm. Ass'n v. Weinberger, 377 F. Supp. 824, 831 (D.D.C. 1974) (invali-
dating FDA restrictions on the distribution of methadone as a condition of approval), aff'd
per curiam, 530 F.2d 1054 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Mark A. Hurwitz, Note, Bundling Patented Drugs
and Medical Services: An Antitrust Analysis, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1188, 1192-95 (1991); see also
Anna Wilde Mathews & Leila Abboud, 1FDA Approves Generic OxyContin, WALL ST.J., Mar. 24,
2004, at A3 ("[T]he FDA has never limited any opioid to certain pharmacies, and agency
officials say they don't have the authority to block certain physicians from prescribing a
drug.").
79 See Lars Noah, Ambivalent Commitments to Federalism in Controlling the Practice of
Medicine, 53 U. KAN. L. REv. 149, 153, 188-91 (2004). In a recent commentary, one former
FDA official (who had just left his post as a deputy commissioner) explained that risk-
management plans "already guide the use of about 30 marketed drugs as part of 'volun-
tary' arrangements with drug companies." Scott Gottlieb, Op-Ed., Prescription for Trouble,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 2007, at A19.
80 See Francesca Lunzer Kritz, Still Irritable, Still Waiting: After Return to Market, Lotronex
Can Be Hard to Get, WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 2003, at F1 (discussing restrictions on access to a
drug used for the treatment of irritable bowel syndrome, and explaining that similar physi-
cian registration requirements apply to felbamate (used for epilepsy) and clozapine (used
for schizophrenia)).
81 See Rita Rubin, Thalidomide Could Guide Use of Drugs That Risk Birth Defects, USA To-
DAY, July 22, 1998, at 7D; see also Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Thalidomide Approved to Treat Leprosy,
with Other Uses Seen, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1998, at Al ("If any doctors or pharmacists refuse
to comply with the distribution rules, their privileges to prescribe or dispense the drug
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tion restrictions in connection with Accutane® (isotretinoin) 82 and
Mifeprex® (mifepristone).83
Perhaps the power to license implies a power to impose condi-
tions on approval. Congress has, for instance, invited the FDA to im-
pose such other conditions on product approvals as it may deem
necessary in certain limited circumstances.8 4 Beyond such situations,
however, courts should hold agencies to the limits of their enabling
statutes.8 5 Congress has authorized the FDA to impose certain condi-
tions on food additive and new drug approvals (e.g., warning require-
ments); it has not explicitly authorized other requirements (e.g.,
recalls or postmarketing surveillance); and it implicitly or explicitly
forbade the imposition of still other requirements (e.g., preclearance
of drug advertising) -the latter category should be off limits, leaving
parties at most to bargain over commitments about which Congress
expressed no intent one way or another.
might be revoked."); Jamie Talan, Thalidomide's Legacy, WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 2000, at F10
(reporting that physicians who prescribe the drug receive from the manufacturer an "edu-
cation kit, including a consent form to be signed by both doctor and patient").
82 See Ami E. Doshi, Comment, The Cost of Clear Skin: Balancing the Social and Safety
Costs of iPLEDGE with the Efficacy of Accutane (Isotretinoin), 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 625,
630-45 (2007); see also Gardiner Harris, F.D.A. Imposes Tougher Rules for Acne Drug, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 13, 2005, at Al ("The new program is the latest and by far most drastic of more
than 40 efforts by the agency in the last 22 years to reduce harm from Accutane ... while
allowing its continued use."); Anti-Pregnancy Effort Fails, WASH. POST, July 31, 2007, at AIO
("The new figures show the 122 pregnancies reported in the first year of the iPledge pro-
gram are about the same as the number reported annually before the FDA tightened re-
strictions on the drug .... ").
83 See Lars Noah, A Miscarriage in the Drug Approval Process?: Mifepristone Embroils the
FDA in Abortion Politics, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 571, 584-86 (2001); id. at 581-82
("Mifepristone's eligibility to use such [accelerated review] procedures remains something
of a mystery: the drug did not provide the type of therapeutic benefit over existing treat-
ments for a serious illness that the regulations contemplated as justifying an expedited
approval process .... Apparently the agency took this route so that it could better justify
imposing otherwise unauthorized restrictions on the use and distribution of the
drug .... ); Gina Kolata, Ready in 4 Weeks: Woman Will Be Able to End Early Pregnancy in Her
Own Home, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2000, at Al ("A woman will be given written instruc-
tions .... and her doctor must sign a statement saying they have read the instructions and
will comply with them exactly."). The FDA has not, however, enforced these restrictions.
See Marc Kaufman, Death After Abortion Pill Reignites Safety Debate, WASH. PosT, Nov. 3, 2003,
at A3; see also Rob Stein, As Abortion Rate Drops, Use of RU-486 Is on the Rise, WASH. PosT, Jan.
22, 2008, at Al.
84 See 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(1)(A) (2000) (food additives); id. § 360j (e) (1) (B) (re-
stricted devices).
85 "One may well ask how far an agency might go in conditioning licenses. In addi-
tion to postmarketing studies and the waiver of hearing rights .... could the FDA condi-
tion product approvals on agreements not to engage in broadcast advertising or not to
raise drug prices faster than the rate of inflation?" Noah, supra note 26, at 883; see also id.
("Could the Agency demand waivers of patent rights or promises to contribute some per-
centage of profits to a public health agency (or perhaps the Republican National Commit-
tee)?"); id. at 933 ("[T]he FDA presumably understands that it cannot condition product
approvals on voluntary price controls or charitable contributions, even though Congress
has not expressly prohibited such demands.").
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C. Expanding Regulatory Jurisdiction
The FDA has shown tremendous creativity in construing the
reach of its authority, as, for example, it did one decade ago in an-
nouncing that it would control human cloning experiments. 8 6 The
agency must, of course, grapple with advances in science and technol-
ogy that Congress could not have anticipated many decades earlier,
including the advent of genetically modified foods,87 bioengineered
drugs,88  nanotechnology, s9  tissue engineering and regenerative
medicine, 90 gene therapy,91 and pharmacogenomics. 92 Conversely,
the FDA has at times tried to escape the occasionally precise (and, to
its mind, inflexible) directives issued by Congress. 93
86 See Richard A. Merrill & Bryan J. Rose, FDA Regulation of Human Cloning: Usurpation
or Statesmanship?, 15 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 85, 97-100 (2001); see also Gary E. Gamerman,
Note, Intended Use and Medical Devices: Distinguishing Nonmedical "Devices" from Medical "De-
vices" Under 21 U.S.C. § 321(h), 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 806, 831-50 (1993) (discussing the
FDA's creativity in using its power to regulate medical devices to reach other types of prod-
ucts). See generally FRED H. DEGNAN, FDA's CREATIVE APPLICATION OF THE LAW (2d ed.
2006).
87 See Lars Noah & Richard A. Merrill, Starting from Scratch ?: Reinventing the Food Addi-
tive Approval Process, 78 B.U. L. REv. 329, 405-13 (1998); see also id. at 332, 401-05, 413-21
(discussing the challenges posed by other novel food additives such as the artificial sweet-
ener aspartame and the fat-substitute olestra).
88 See Lars Noah, Managing Biotechnology's [RIevolution: Has Guarded Enthusiasm Become
Benign Neglect?, 11 VA. J.L. & TECH. 4 (2006); id. at 37-38 (describing difficulties with at-
tempts to extend to biotech drugs the FDA's authority to approve cheaper generics); id. at
39-43 (discussing "pharming," which refers to the engineering of crops or livestock to
produce pharmaceuticals); see also id. at 50-51 & nn.234, 236 (applauding the FDA's deci-
sion not to subject a bioengineered aquarium fish to its new animal drug approval author-
ity as "an exercise of healthy institutional restraint by declining uncertain jurisdiction").
89 See id. at 61 ("If biotechnology rendered untenable the traditional distinction be-
tween drugs and biologics, then nanomedicine may do the same to the line separating
devices and biologics."); Keay Davidson, FDA Urged to Limit Nanoparticle Use in Cosmetics and
Sunscreens, S.F. CHRON., May 17, 2006, at A4; Rick Weiss, Nanotechnology Risks Unknown:
Insufficient Attention Paid to Potential Dangers, Report Says, WASH. POST, Sept. 26, 2006, at Al 2.
90 See Lars Noah, A Postmodernist Take on the Human Embryo Research Debate, 36 CONN. L.
REv. 1133, 1146-47 & n.66 (2004); Michael Leachman, Comment, Regulation of the Human
Tissue Industry: A Callfor Fast-Track Regulations, 65 LA. L. REv. 443 (2004); Rick Weiss, First
Bladders Grown in Lab Transplanted: Breakthrough Shows Promise for Creating Other Human Or-
gans, WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 2006, at Al.
91 See Noah, supra note 88, at 17; Rick Weiss, Death Points to Risks in Research: One
Woman's Experience in Gene Therapy Trial Highlights Weaknesses in the Patient Safety Net, WASH.
POST, Aug. 6, 2007, at Al.
92 See Lars Noah, The Coming Pharmacogenomics Revolution: Tailoring Drugs to Fit Patients'
Genetic Profiles, 43 JURIMETRICS J. 1, 12-24 (2002); id. at 11 ("Federal regulators-accus-
tomed to large clinical trials using a diverse subject population and designed to test drugs
with significant market potential, centralized manufacturing facilities, and uniform label-
ing-will have to cope with a radically altered model of drug development and use.");
Janet Woodcock, FDA Policy on Pharmacogenomic Data in Drug Development, 66 LA. L. Rav. 91
(2005); Symposium, Pharmacogenomics, 46JuRUMETIUCSJ. 237 (2006); Gina Kolata, A Tale of
Two Drugs Hints at Promise for Genetic Testing, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2006, at Fl.
93 See Noah & Merrill, supra note 87, at 443 ("Out of necessity, the [FDA] has been
forced to improvise, sometimes evading its unrealistic directives from Congress."); id. at
395-401 (discussing application of the Delaney clause to suspected carcinogens); id. at
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In the early 1970s, the FDA's Chief Counsel expressed the view
that the agency's enabling statute represented a broad "constitution,"
authorizing it to protect the public health by any necessary and
proper means, rather than a limited and precise delegation of power
from Congress. 94 Accordingly, unless explicitly prohibited, "the fact
that Congress simply has not considered or spoken on a particular
issue certainly is no bar to the [FDA] exerting initiative and leader-
ship in the public interest."95 His successor in that office, though writ-
ing many years after leaving government service, analogized the FDCA
to an unfinished set of architectural blueprints. 96 As explained by one
of the chief congressional "architects" of detailed amendments to the
original statutory provisions governing medical devices, however, the
greater specificity of this legislation sought "to make clear that Con-
gress wanted the agencies to follow the Congressional mandate more
carefully and not go off on bureaucratic binges pursuing bureaucratic
whims." 9 7
422-28 (identifying persistent agency failures to meet deadlines for taking action); see also
id. at 382-85 (describing the FDA's creation of a category of "interim" food additives); id.
at 411-13, 433-35 (comparing abbreviated premarket notification procedures that the
agency has applied to medical devices and other products in order to avoid the difficulties
associated with full premarket review).
94 See Peter Barton Hutt, Philosophy of Regulation Under the Federal Food, Drug and Cos-
metic Act, 28 FooD DRUG CosM. L.J. 177, 178 (1973) ("[T]he Act must be regarded as a
constitution.... The mission of the [FDA] is to implement [the Act's fundamental] objec-
tives through the most effective and efficient controls that can be devised.").
95 Id. at 179; see also United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280 (1943) (sug-
gesting that the FDA's enabling statute be treated as "a working instrument of government
and not merely as a collection of English words"); cf United States v. Nova Scotia Food
Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 248 n.10 (2d Cir. 1977) ("[W]e think Mr. Hutt's language to be
conscious hyperbole. The test is . . .whether delegation may be fairly inferred from the
general purpose."). Agency officials have, at times, continued to take this expansive view
of their jurisdiction. See, e.g., David A. Kessler & Wayne L. Pines, The Federal Regulation of
Prescription Drug Advertising and Promotion, 264JAMA 2409, 2411 (1990) ("Until furtherjudi-
cial decisions or congressional action clarifies the FDA's specific authority in the area of
[drug product] promotion, the FDA will continue to assert broad jurisdiction.").
96 See Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, 82
VA. L. REv. 1753, 1757 (1996) ("[A]s in any long-running regulatory program, FDA officials
have served as both general contractors and sub-contractors in constructing the modern
legal framework from the legislature's working drawings."); cf id. at 1864 ("Nor are FDA's
decisions-to grant, withhold, or delay approval-commonly challenged in court.... The
FDA product approval system is, in short, remarkably free from conventional legal
constraint.").
97 Paul G. Rogers, Medical Device Law-Intent and Implementation, 36 FoOD DRUG COSM.
L.J. 4, 4 (1981) (noting that "the philosophy behind the writing of the Medical Device
Amendments [of 1976] was to be so specific in language that less discretion was left to the
agency"); see also 62 Cases More or Less, Each Containing Six Jars of Jam v. United States,
340 U.S. 593, 600 (1951) ("In our anxiety to effectuate the congressional purpose of pro-
tecting the public, we must take care not to extend the scope of the statute beyond the
point where Congress indicated it would stop.") (quoted with approval in FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 161 (2000)); United States v. Parkinson, 240 F.2d
918, 921 (9th Cir. 1956) ("The record of the past few decades is replete with examples of
the tendency of executive agencies to expand their field of operations. A passion and a
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During the 1990s, the FDA asserted the authority to regulate to-
bacco products as medical devices, and some commentators invoked
the constitutional metaphor to defend this creative effort against
claims that the agency had overstepped the limits on its jurisdiction. 98
One scholar took the idea a step further and argued that enabling
statutes express little more than broad goals to pursue, much like
common law norms that judges explicate in the course of resolving
private disputes.99 Elsewhere, I have argued at length against these
positions,100 especially as used in an attempt tojustify the FDA's asser-
tion of jurisdiction over tobacco products.10' In the course of invali-
dating the agency's restrictions on cigarette advertising, the Supreme
zeal to crusade affects their operations."); H. Thomas Austern, Philosophy of Regulation: A
Reply to Mr. Hutt, 28 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 189, 191 (1973) (criticizing the suggestion that
.a well-motivated administrative agency can legally do what it alone deems desirable unless
Congress has in advance specifically prohibited it").
98 See, e.g., James T. O'Reilly, Tobacco and the Regulatory Earthquake: Why the FDA Will
Prevail After the Smoke Clears, 24 N. Ky. L. REv. 509, 515 (1997) ("If the statute is a constitu-
tion then the FDA can reach anywhere and regulate anything not proscribed by
Congress.").
99 See Cass R. Sunstein, Is Tobacco a Drug? Administrative Agencies as Common Law Courts,
47 DUKE L.J. 1013, 1062 (1998) ("In applying the FDCA to tobacco, the FDA performed a
lawful common law function, one that also has a high degree of democratic legitimacy.");
see also id. at 1019 ("Operating as common law courts, agencies have, as they should, con-
siderable power to adapt statutory language to changing understandings and circum-
stances."); id. at 1060 (describing dynamic interpretation of statutes as "an administrative
task, not a judicial one," and calling the common law decision making of agencies "an
omnipresent feature of the modern legal landscape"); id. at 1068 ("As a matter of simple
practice, administrative agencies have become America's common law courts.... In view
of agency self-interest and the exercise of power by self-interested private groups, this de-
velopment is not without risks. On balance, however, it is highly salutary.").
100 See Lars Noah, Interpreting Agency Enabling Acts: Misplaced Metaphors in Administrative
Law, 41 WM. & MARY L. Rv. 1463, 1530 (2000) ("The rush to defend seemingly desirable
regulatory initiatives should not blind us to the potentially serious institutional conse-
quences of adopting a stance of excessive faith in administrative agencies."); id. at 1498
("As creatures of statutes lacking any independent constitutional pedigree, agencies can-
not invoke some kind of inherent authority to justify actions that find no warrant in their
enabling legislation."); id. at 1504 ("In the end, no single metaphor accurately captures the
variety of organic acts, and Congress may have shifted from the open-ended and aspira-
tional delegations of earlier this century to the somewhat more precise and constrained
enabling statutes of today.").
101 See Lars Noah, Regulating Cigarettes: (Non)sense and Sensibility, 22 S. ILL. U. L.J. 677,
691 (1998) (arguing that the FDA "should not be free to ignore the outer boundaries of its
delegated authority in pursuit of a well-meaning crusade against a public health prob-
lem"); id. at 685-86 (criticizing the FDA's request for serial Chevron deference, with each
step compounding the initial error); see also Lars Noah, Divining Regulatory Intent: The Place
for a "Legislative History" of Agency Rules, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 255, 305-06 & n.193 (2000)
("[R]egulatory officials [are] busy cloaking themselves in that safe haven from the outset
of a rulemaking or other proceeding, instead of attempting to offer persuasive explana-
tions defending the reasonableness of their preferred interpretations and then only later,
in defending against a judicial challenge, invoking Chevron as a kicker.").
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Court sensibly declined to view the FDCA as akin to an adaptable
constitution. 102
II
INDIFFERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION
Although courts expect agencies to take the Constitution into ac-
count, 10 3 at times the FDA has shown a marked indifference to consti-
tutional limits on its range of actions. 10 4 During the 1990s, for
instance, the Washington Legal Foundation (WLF) challenged the
agency's efforts to limit the dissemination of information by manufac-
turers of drugs and medical devices. 10 5 Once a new drug or device
receives marketing clearance from the FDA, the manufacturer can
promote it only for those indications set forth in the approved label-
ing, though physicians remain free to use the product for other pur-
poses.106 The FDA had become concerned that some sellers had
102 See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 161 (2000) (empha-
sizing that "an administrative agency's power to regulate in the public interest must always
be grounded in a valid grant of authority from Congress"); see also id. at 165 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (unsuccessfully invoking the constitutional metaphor); Marcia Coyle, More to
FDA Ruling Than Tobacco?, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 3, 2000, at A4. In recent years, lower courts also
have become less willing to countenance expansive interpretations of the agency's jurisdic-
tion. See, e.g., Nutritional Health Alliance v. FDA, 318 F.3d 92, 98-101 (2d Cir. 2003)
(holding that the agency's authority to prevent adulteration, including through the issu-
ance of GMPs, did not authorize the promulgation of a rule-that the agency had made in
response to incidents of poisoning in children-requiring sellers of certain iron-contain-
ing products to distribute those products in unit-dose packages); Ass'n Am. Physicians &
Surgeons v. FDA, 226 F. Supp. 2d 204, 213 (D.D.C. 2002) ("Section 371 does not constitute
an independent grant of authority that permits FDA to issue any regulation the agency
determines would advance the public health. Rather, § 371 permits the FDA to use rules as
a means of administering authorities otherwise delegated to it by the Congress.").
103 See Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 986 F.2d 537,
539-40 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (noting that an agency should consider First Amendment con-
straints when interpreting its enabling act); see also Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional
Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1189, 1215, 1223-26, 1237 (2006).
104 See Lars Noah, What's Wrong with "Constitutionalizing Food and Drug Law"?, 75 TUL. L.
REv. 137, 139-46 (2000) [hereinafter Noah, What's Wrong]; see also Lars Noah, Too High a
Price for Some Drugs?: The FDA Burdens Reproductive Choice, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 231, 243-58
(2007) (questioning the constitutionality of requirements that patients use contraceptives
as a condition of access to drugs that carry a risk of causing birth defects); Lars Noah, Treat
Yourself. Is Self-Medication the Prescription for What Ails American Health Care?, 19 HARv. J.L. &
TECH. 359, 385-91 (2006) [hereinafter Noah, Treat Yoursel]] (arguing that an involuntary
Rx-to-OTC drug switch might raise a Takings problem).
105 See Wash. Legal Found. v. Kessler, 880 F. Supp. 26, 27-28 (D.D.C. 1995); see also
Edmund Polubinski III, Note, Closing the Channels of Communication: A First Amendment Anal-
ysis of the FDA's Policy on Manufacturer Promotion of "Off-Label" Use, 83 VA. L. Rxv. 991,
1019-34 (1997).
106 See Lars Noah, Constraints on the Off-Label Uses of Prescription Drug Products, 16 J.
PRODS. & Toxics LtAB. 139, 140-44 (1994); see also David C. Radley et al., Off-label Prescribing
Among Office-Based Physicians, 166 ARCHIVES INRNAL MED. 1021, 1025 (2006) (finding
"that about 21% of all estimated uses for commonly prescribed medications were off-label,
and that 15% of all estimated uses lacked scientific evidence of therapeutic efficacy").
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promoted such "off-label" uses indirectly, for instance by sponsoring
continuing medical education (CME) programs and scientific sympo-
sia featuring discussions about unapproved uses of their products and
by providing health care professionals with "enduring materials"
(namely, textbooks or reprints of published articles) mentioning such
uses. In 1992, the agency issued a "draft policy statement" to inform
the industry that it might regard such activities as unlawful product
promotions unless manufacturers took certain steps to ensure edito-
rial independence.1 0 7 Although characterized at the time as a "safe
harbor,"108 these announcements reflected an agency crackdown on
perceived industry excesses rather than an enlightened effort to liber-
alize existing prohibitions that seemed unduly restrictive.
The FDA formulated its off-label promotion policies in a manner
designed to evade normal administrative law constraints. The draft
policy statement evolved into a pair of "draft guidance" documents on
enduring materials published in 1995,109 which were finalized one
year later,110 and into a "final guidance" document on CME programs
published in 1997.111 Although not formally binding, even in their
final form,1 2 these various FDA guidelines unmistakably sought to al-
ter the behavior of pharmaceutical and medical device companies.
The federal district court understood these realities when, in the first
phase of the WLF litigation, it rejected the FDA's claim that the chal-
lenge to the draft policy statement was not ripe for judicial review;
Judge Lamberth speculated that the FDA would "threaten[ ] (but
never actually initiat[e]) enforcement procedures against companies
which failed to comply with the agency's defacto policy."113
After the agency replaced its draft policy statement with guidance
documents, the district court held them unconstitutional, and it en-
joined any agency attempts to apply these restrictive policies. 114 Only
107 See Draft Policy Statement on Industry-Supported Scientific and Educational Activi-
ties, 57 Fed. Reg. 56,412 (Nov. 27, 1992).
108 See David G. Adams, FDA Regulation of Communications on Pharmaceutical Products, 24
SETON HALL L. REV. 1399, 1409-17 (1994) (describing the origins of this policy, and de-
fending its constitutionality).
109 See Advertising and Promotion; Draft Guidances, 60 Fed. Reg. 62,471 (Dec. 6,
1995).
110 See Advertising and Promotion; Guidances, 61 Fed. Reg. 52,800 (Oct. 8, 1996).
111 See Final Guidance on Industry-Supported Scientific and Educational Activities, 62
Fed. Reg. 64,074 (Dec. 3, 1997).
112 See, e.g., id. at 64,094 n.1 ("This guidance represents the Agency's current think-
ing.., and does not operate to bind FDA or the industry .. "); see also supra note 24 and
accompanying text (discussing the limited force of FDA guidelines).
113 Wash. Legal Found. v. Kessler, 880 F. Supp. 26, 34 (D.D.C. 1995); see also id. at 36
("[Flew if any companies are willing to directly challenge the FDA in this manner....
[M]anufacturers are most reluctant to arouse the ire of such a powerful agency.").
114 See Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 74 (D.D.C. 1§98), amended
by 36 F. Supp. 2d 16, 19-20 (D.D.C. 1999), amended sub nom. Wash. Legal Found. v. Hen-
20081
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after Congress enacted relevant provisions in 1997 did the FDA bother
to undertake notice-and-comment rulemaking to promulgate formally
binding requirements to control the dissemination of enduring
materials describing off-label uses of drugs and medical devices. 115 Af-
ter further briefing, Judge Lamberth held that even these less onerous
restrictions violated the First Amendment.1 16
The FDA's string of setbacks in the courts must have come as
something of an unpleasant surprise to agency officials. The defer-
ence that judges historically have shown the FDA, bordering on the
position that the agency could do no wrong, did not surface in newer
opinions that express some impatience with the FDA's seeming disre-
gard for the First Amendment. As these courts pointed out, some of
the agency's responses to the constitutional objections bordered on
the frivolous." 7 Nonetheless, the appellate court lifted most of Judge
Lamberth's injunction.' 18 During oral argument, the government
had offered a fanciful interpretation of the relevant statutory provi-
sion as creating no directly enforceable restrictions but instead a "safe
harbor,"' 1 9 suggesting that a company not moored in this safe harbor
still might not run afoul of the preexisting prohibitions against off-
label drug promotion.120
ney, 56 F. Supp. 2d 81, 87 (D.D.C. 1999), vacated in part and appeal dismissed, 202 F.3d 331
(D.C. Cir. 2000).
115 See Dissemination of Information on Unapproved/New Uses for Marketed Drugs,
Biologics, and Devices, 63 Fed. Reg. 64,556 (Nov. 20, 1998) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 99
(2007)).
116 See Henney, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 87.
117 See Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (calling "almost frivolous"
the FDA's argument that health claims for dietary supplements were inherently mislead-
ing); Henney, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 85 (calling "preposterous" the FDA's argument that FDAMA
need not comply with the First Amendment because it affirmatively permits truthful
speech); Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 59 ("This court is hard pressed to believe that the
agency is seriously contending that 'promotion' of an activity is conduct and not speech, or
that 'promotion' is entitled to no First Amendment protection."); id. at 66 (dismissing as
tautological" the FDA's argument that off-label promotion gets no constitutional protec-
tion because it violates statute); see also id. at 67 ("In asserting that any and all scientific
claims about . . . prescription drugs are presumptively untruthful or misleading until the
FDA has had the opportunity to evaluate them, FDA exaggerates its overall place in the
universe.").
118 See Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331, 336-37 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
119 See id. at 335 ("In response to questioning at oral argument, the government defini-
tively stated that it subscribed to the 'safe harbor' interpretation and further explained
that, in its view, neither the FDAMA nor the CME Guidance independently authorizes the
FDA to prohibit or to sanction speech."); see also Noah, What's Wrong, supra note 104, at
146-48 (explaining the flaws in this interpretation).
120 Although perhaps reflecting a plausible characterization of the agency's earlier gui-
dance documents, this reading seemingly ignored the effect of FDAMA's provision that
makes violations a distinct "prohibited act" under the statute that can trigger the imposi-
tion of formal sanctions, see 21 U.S.C. § 331 (z) (2000), and it also disregarded the practical
consequences of any such safe harbor. After remand, Judge Lamberth concluded that
nothing remained of the injunction. See Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 128 F. Supp. 2d
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At other times, when it happens to suit the purposes of the in-
cumbent administration, the FDA has seemed overly attentive to possi-
ble constitutional limits on its authority-one might say that this
amounts to a selective preoccupation with constitutional constraints
tojustify indifference to statutory directives. 21 In Thompson v. Western
States Medical Center,122 the Supreme Court invalidated a statutory pro-
hibition on advertising by pharmacists about compounded dn-gs. As
an exercise in constitutional jurisprudence, the case hardly broke new
ground-the members of the Court evaluated the question using a
well-worn form of intermediate scrutiny, differing in their respective
assessments of whether the government had demonstrated a sufficient
nexus between the means selected and its asserted interest in prevent-
ing the risks associated with the commercialization of unapproved
new drugs under the guise of pharmacy compounding.1 23 The deci-
sion did stand out as the first time that the Supreme Court had invali-
dated a recently enacted congressional restriction on advertising,
thereby showing little deference to the judgments of a coordinate
branch of government, and it certainly solidified a trend evident over
the last decade of taking seriously the constitutional rights of entities
wishing to engage in commercial speech.
11, 15 (D.D.C. 2000). In 2006, because of a sunset provision in FDAMA, the FDA became
free again to formulate its own policies governing the dissemination of enduring materials
that discussed off-label uses. See Gardiner Harris, FD.A. Seeks to Broaden Range of Use for
Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2008, at BI (reporting that the agency had proposed even more
flexible guidelines).
121 Cf Morrison, supra note 103, at 1236-37, 1259; id. at 1195 (explaining that in some
instances, "we may fairly suspect that the government has invoked avoidance in an effort to
cover a fundamentally political decision with the veneer of legal obligation"); id. at 1229
(recognizing that "the executive's use of avoidance to construe a speech-restrictive statute
would generally redound to the benefit of a private actor at the expense of the executive
branch"). The FDA also has deployed make-weight statutory arguments when seeking to
resist taking action that it finds distasteful. See Noah, Treat Yourself, supra note 104, at 375
n.88 (discussing inexplicable delays in switching an emergency contraceptive product to
nonprescription status).
122 535 U.S. 357 (2002).
123 Justice O'Connor's opinion for the majority offered a somewhat cramped reading
of the government's asserted interest-as simply wanting to draw a line between large-scale
drug manufacturing and small-scale pharmacy compounding-and then rejected the gov-
ernment's argument that the act of advertising the availability of particular drugs served as
a proxy for commercial activity that should have to comply with the FDA's premarket ap-
proval requirements. See id. at 369-77. She suggested a number of other alternatives for
making such a distinction without needing to restrict speech. See id. at 372-73. The major-
ity's unforgiving application of the nexus requirement mimicked the least restrictive means
test normally reserved for strict scrutiny cases and demanded a probably unattainable level
of legislative precision. The majority also failed to concede that the legislation had not in
fact prevented pharmacists from advertising the fact that they offered compounding ser-
vices in general or that they offered particular types of drugs-Congress simply insisted
that, before doing the latter, pharmacists satisfy the FDA's demanding new drug approval
requirements or face the risk of sanctions identical to those applicable to other entities
that might attempt to sell unapproved new drugs.
2008] 923
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
In some ways, the FDA's reaction to the Court's fairly narrow de-
cision represented the most startling aspect of this litigation. Instead
of a grudging response, the agency took it as an occasion to recon-
sider its entire approach to regulation. Traditionally, the FDA has de-
pended on its ability to control product information.1 24 Less than
three weeks after the Court announced its decision in Western States,
however, the agency published a notice inviting public comments on a
series of questions that, while carefully framed in neutral terms, im-
plied that it might welcome suggestions favoring the deregulation of
labeling and advertising. 125 The agency almost never moves with such
dispatch.
The FDA's announcement represented a dramatic about-face for
an agency that until recently had taken the position that it need not
concern itself with the First Amendment. 126 Although an admirable
act of self-examination, the announcement also reflected a significant
shift in personnel at the agency in 2001: the new Chief Counsel had
spent a number of years representing the WLF in its challenges to
other FDA policies. The agency's suggestion that it might deregulate
labeling and advertising attracted substantial attention.1 27 Nothing,
however, ever came of the FDA's remarkable proposal to get out of
the business of controlling the dissemination of information, and in
recently revising the format and content requirements for prescrip-
tion drug labeling, the agency offered a brief constitutional defense
without ever mentioning Western States.128
CONCLUSION
Necessity may be the mother of invention, but over the course of
a century of struggling to protect the public health with its limited
statutory powers and often inadequate resources, the FDA evidently
has institutionalized a practice of cavalierly ignoring legal constraints.
At times, the agency's creativity has received belated endorsement
from Congress or the courts, though, on other occasions, members of
124 IARS NOAH, LAW, MEDICINE, AND MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY 317 (2d ed. 2007).
125 See Request for Comment on First Amendment Issues, 67 Fed. Reg. 34,942 (May 16,
2002). It took another three weeks before the FDA responded to the Court's more limited
holding by issuing a revised guidance document to govern pharmacy compounding. See
Pharmacy Compounding Compliance Policy Guide; Availability, 67 Fed. Reg. 39,409 (June
7, 2002).
126 See supra note 117.
127 See, e.g., Marc Kaufman, FDA Seeks Public Comment on Rules' Constitutionality: Advocates
Wory Agency Might Loosen Its Oversight, WASH. POST, May 15, 2002, at A25; Gina Kolata, Stung
by Courts, FD.A. Rethinks Its Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2002, at Fl.
128 See Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription
Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3964 (Jan. 24, 2006) (codified at 21
C.F.R. pts. 201, 314 & 601 (2007)); see alsojulie Schmit, Drug Ads to Get More FDA Scrutiny,
USA TODAY, Feb. 25, 2008, at lB.
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these branches have condemned it for showing excessive initiative.
Most of the FDA's decisions, however, escape any such scrutiny, which
means that nothing other than humility and self-restraint stand in the
way of regulatory overreaching. It seems that whenever, in the course
of pursuing its vision of the public good, this little agency found that it
could get away with doing something, the FDA blithely disregarded its
obligation of fidelity to constitutional and statutory constraints. Even
if we applaud the ends that the agency sought to achieve, such a pat-
tern of behavior represents a serious affront to the rule of law.
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